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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PETER MART JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RANGHILD V. JORGENSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8618 
BRIEF OF DEFENDAN'T AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and defendant were born in Den-
mark and were acquainted with one another before 
immigrating to America. The defendant arrived in 
this country about seven months after the plaintiff. 
They were married in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
May 6, 1922. (R. 14) There are two children issue 
of the marriage, both of whom are of age and 
married. ( R. 14) 
The plaintiff is a florist by trade. In 1932 
he started in business for himself. In addition to 
her household duties the defendant worked in the 
business with him, confining her efforts mostly to 
the retail part of it. (R. 54, 55) In 1949 they took 
over the Hyland Floral on a lease from one John 
Quist, which they operated as a partnership. (R. 
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17) The defendant continued to work in the busi-
ness with the plaintiff until December 10, 1955, 
when he ordered her off the business premises. ( R. 
56, 95) Both parties worked diligently, whereby 
they acquired fixed assets of a considerable value ' 
and also derived a substantial income from the op-
eration of the Hyland Floral business (R. 176-183, 1 
35-40). I 
The parties experienced no marital difficulty · 
until 1938 or '39, when they had trouble over the 
plaintiff's attentions to a Mrs. Rigmor Tronier. 
( R. 57, 9 7) This storm blew over and they lived a 
happy married life until plaintiff became interested 
in one Marie Antoinette Nielson in 1953 while the 
defendant was on a trip to Denmark. (R. 59). De-
fendant first learned of this situation in November 
of 1954. ( R. 63, 102). Although she had observed 
a change in plaintiff's attitude toward her. (R. 98, 
99) Attempts at reconciliation were unsuccessful. 
(R. 110) 
On or about August 30, 1955, the plaintiff re-
fused to pennit the defendant to continue to parti-
cipate in the affairs of the floral business and com-
nlenced an action for divorce. ( R. 129, 130) Defen-
dant didn't \Yant a divorce (R. 106, 109, 110), but 
when the action was conunenced, counterclaimed 
and as a result of the trial she was granted the di-
\'oi·ee. The court made disposition of some 9f the pro-
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perty of the parties and entered its decree with re-
spect to other property interests. 
STA'TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DECREE IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT 
ADJUDICATE THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES. 
POINT II. 
THE DECREE DOES NOT MAKE AN EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DECREE IS INDEFINITE AND DOES NOT 
ADJUDICATE THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE 
PARTIES. 
At the outset should be kept in mind that the 
parties were actually partners in the operation of 
the Hyland Floral business and even though the 
defendant does not wish to continue in this busi-
ness relationship with plaintiff (R. 127, 128, 129), 
the court requires her to do so against her will. 
Although a partner, the decree gives her no right 
in the control or management of the business. Para-
graph 2 is quoted as follows ( R. 206) : 
"That until the further order of the 
court the partnership existing between the 
parties known as Hyland Floral be and the 
same hereby is continued, the p'laintiff, never-
theless, to receive the sum of $500.00 per 
month from the partnership business as a 
management fee in connection therewith, the 
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sam~ to be paid before the net partnership 
earnings are determined between the plaintiff 
a~~ defendant, which net earnings shall be 
divided and paid over to the parties on or 
before the expiration of sixty days from the 
close of ~ach annual accounting period, the 
net earnings to be after repayment of all 
advan~es and borrowings incident to the par-
tnership or appropr~ate reserves for the same· ~ 
that said partnership, until otherwise ordered 
by the court, shall be managed and operated 
by the plaintiff, and during such time the 
defendant shall haYe no active part in the 
management thereof and she hereby is re-
strained from interfering with said business 
and competing in the same line of business 
on her own account or \vith others; that the 
defendant shall have access at all reasonable 
times to the books and records of said partner-
ship for the purpose of inspection." 
The foregoing pro,-isions giYe the exclusive 
n1anagen1en t of the business to the plaintiff and 
he receives $500.00 per n1onth from the partner-
ship as cmnpensation. In her counterclaim the de-
fendant asks for a dissolution of the partnership 
and an accounting of the property and assets. The 
(l\·irlence of defendant's drinking, Exhibit 2D (R. 
100, 133), his using the partnership funds to pur-
chase uraniu1n stock ( R. 43, 96) and his personal 
conduct, \vas not such as to inspire confidence in his 
ability to operate the business, which in the past 
has been successfully operated by the family as a 
unit. Can the rltlfendant be blamed if she no longer 
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, desires to be associated with the plaintiff even as a 
limited partner? These parties have enjoyed a suc-
cessful marriage and together have raised their 
children. She didn't want this divorce. Attempts to 
reconcile their differences ( R. 110) were futile. 
On two occasions she humbled herself and went to 
the plaintiff and asked him to consider the matter 
and come back home (R. 133). He refused even to 
discuss the rna tter. 
Why compel the defendant to continue in a 
partnership relation with plain tiff after the mar-
riage relation is dissolved? Does such a requirement 
constitute a disposition of the property belonging 
to the parties? Why compel the defendant to assume 
the responsibility of checking books and records of 
the partnership to make sure that the business is 
being properly managed? That is to say, that the 
business is operated in a businesslike manner and 
that proper reserves are being laid aside, that 
proper repairs and replacements are being made? 
Why compel the defendant to assume any respon-
sibility with respect to the operation of said busi-
ness, in her own interest, by permitting the business 
to be continued under the management of the plain-
tiff "until the further order of the court." We sub-
mit that the court has no authority and no juris-
diction in the first instance to enter any decree 
except one which definitely disposes of the property 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
?Y a definite distribution between the parties. He 
lS not authorized to enter a decree under which for j 
an indefinite period plaintiff shall receive $500.00 'l 
\ 
per month and whereby the court presides over the 
destinies of the parties, reserving unto himself the 
power to alter or change their relations with respect 
to their property as he may at some future time 
see fit. What future conditions will prompt the 
court to terminate this partnership even if the court 
had the power to continue it? We are not informed. 
No time is set. \Yill the court choose to supervise 
the operation of the business and later determine 
when the time is propitious for a dissolution? The 
statute confers no such power upon the court. 
Paragraph 3 of the Decree, (R. 206, 207) pro-
vides that: 
''3. That the division of property as 
set forth in the findings of fact herein be and 
the same hereby is confirmed, and in connec-
tion therewith the property at what is com-
monly known as 4580 \Vallace Lan~, Sa~t La~e 
City, Utah, and particularly descr1bed 1n sa1d 
findings is ordered sold, the proceeds of ~e 
sale to be divided equally between the parties, 
the sale price to be not less than $53,500.00, 
and subject to the payment of costs and o~~ 
i terns mentioned in said findings, and 1t lS 
further ordered that the parties execute all 
appropriate docun1ents to effectuate said sale 
and that either party may purchase the in-
terest of the other at such sale, and that the 
court retain jurisdiction to effectuate and 
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carry out the same; that defendant is entitle? 
to live in the home at 4580 Wallace Lane until 
the same is sold or until defendant secures 
the possession of t~e home adjacent to ~he 
Colonial Flower business property as herein-
after decreed, whichever occurs first in point 
of time." 
Paragraph 8 of the Decree, ( R. 208, 209) pro-
vides: 
"8. That the property described in the 
findings of fact herein as the Hillside pro-
perty shall remain in joint tenacy subject to 
the mutual control and disposition of the 
same by the parties and subject to the fur-
ther order of this court, and in the interim 
the parties each to pay one-half of the cost 
of maintenance, including taxes." 
Paragraph 9 of the Decree, ( R. 209) provides: 
"9. That the plaintiff be and he hereby 
is ordered and directed to pay to the defen-
dant alimony in the sum of $350.00 per month 
until the Wallace Lane home property is sold 
or until possession of the home adjacent to the 
Colonial Flower business property on 9th 
c. South Street in Salt Lake City and County, 
i:: State of Utah, can be obtained for defendant's 
use, whichever occurs first in point of time; 
1 that so long as plaintiff is obligated to pay 
1 alimony hereunder defendant is entitled to 
:i: collect and receive the rents from the Colonial 
~: Flower property in the total sum of $300.00 
~· per month, $150.00 of which shall be applied 
~; to the payment of said alimony; that upon the 
~i· contingencies in this paragraph stated, the 
~~ payment of alimony to the defendant shall 
cease and terminate; that alimony payments 
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shal1 commence to coincide with the next ren-
tal payment from the Colonial Flower pro-
perty and shall be thereafter payable on the 
monthly anniversary date of such rental pay-
ments.'' 
Paragraph 10 of the Decree, (R. 209) provides: 
"10. That the Colonial Flower business 
property shall remain in joint tenancy and 
that the rental payments under the present 
lease shall be divided equally between plain- j 
tiff and defendant, provided, however, that 1 
as soon as may be done the home adjoining 
said Colonial Flower business property shall 
be severed as to title and the home shall be-
come and remain the sole property of the de-
fendant; that the court shall retain jurisdic-
tion to effectuate such transfer and division." 
The foregoing provisions of the decree are ob-
jectionable for many reasons. The statute, Section 
30-3-5, provides: 
''When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such order in relation to the 
children, property and parties and the main-
tenance of the parties and children as may 
be equitable; * * * such subsequent changes or 
new orders may be made by the court with 
respect to * * * the distribution of property 
as may be reasonable and proper." 
We submit that this statute has been disre-
garded. The statute specifically requires that the 
Court shall first make such orders in relation to 
the property as may be equitable. This requirement 
is a condition precedent to making any "new orders 
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* * * with respect to * * * the distribution of pro-
perty", and even when it makes the new orders, 
they must, of course, be "reasonable and proper." 
Every decree should be certain and definite 
and the statute contemplates finality in the decree 
unless conditions change which make "new orders" 
advisable. Our court in Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 89 
Utah 554, 58 P. 2d 11, referring to the Statute 
30-3-5, makes this statement: 
"The power of a court to make amend-
ments in particulars authorized by the sta-
tute just quoted is not without limits. Thus, 
in the absence of changed conditions or cir-
cumstances a modification of a decree may 
not be had.'' (Citing cases.) 
Of course, we are not here concerned with "new 
orders" which change or alter the decree. We are 
concerned only with the decree itself which should, 
under the statute, make a definite and final distri-
bution of the property before the Court would have 
any jurisdiction to make any new order. This the 
Court has not done. 
As stated in the case of Luithle vs. Luithle, 
(Wash.) 161 P. 2d 152: 
"It is now accepted as a fundamental 
proposition that in a divorce action the court 
has complete jurisdiction of all the property 
of the parties whether community or separ-
ate, and may dispose of it in such manner as 
is equitable and just under all the circum-
stances." (citing cases) 
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The court then quotes from an earlier Wash-
ington case: 
"This language (as now contained in 
Rem. Revised Statutes Section 989) is com-
prehensive; it is an equitable division of the 
property rights of the parties that the court 
is authorized to make. * * * The parties shall 
bring into court all their property and a com-
plete showing must be made. Each party must 
lay down before the chancellor all that he or 
she has, and after an examination into the 
whole case, he makes an equitable division. 
* * * The law does not require an equal di-
vision of the property, but a 'just and equit-
able' division, and as no general rule for a 
just and equitable division can be laid down, 
but each case must be adjusted according to 
its own merits and the particular circum-
stances surrounding it, the court investigates 
all the circumstances.'' 
In Holm vs. Holm, (Wash.) 178 P. 2d 725, 
729, the court referring to a statute similar to our 
own, remarks: 
"'This section of the statute fixes no ar-
bitrary, nor any hard and fast, rule by which 
the disposition of property between parties 
to a divorce action is to be determined; nor 
are such questions determinable by any rule 
of law less general than the statutory rule 
itself. Kolbe v. Kolbe, 50 Wash. 298, 97 P. 
236; Leonhard v. Leonhard, 147 Wash. 311, 
265 P. 1118; Van Kleffens v. Van Kleffens, 
150 Wash. 685, 27 4 P. 708. It will be noted 
that the statute simply, but emphatically, re-
quires the court to make a 'just and equit-
able' disposition of the property, having re-
10 
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gard to the merits of the parties, the condi-
tions in which they will be left by the divorce, 
the particular sources through which the pro-
perty was acquired, and the burdens imposed 
upon it for the benefit of the children. 
* * * * 
"With reference to the power of the 
court in making disposition of property in 
divorce cases, it is well established in this 
state that all of the property of the parties, 
whether it be community property or separ-
ate property, is before the court, for such dis-
position as is just and equitable under the 
facts and circumstances of the particular 
case. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 199 Wash. 393, 91 
P. 2d 1005; Luithle v. Luithle, 23 Wash. 2d 
494, 161 P. 2d 152." 
Take the home property at 4580 Wallace Lane, 
referred to in paragraph 3 of the Decree above 
quoted, and which is held in joint tenancy (Finding 
6, R. 197). Why should the court deprive defendant 
of her home and compel her to live on 9th South? 
Has the court the right to require that she accept 
a home where she does not choose to live? She is the 
innocent party and should be entitled as a part of 
the partnership assets to have the home awarded 
to her. Her claim to the home should be resolved in 
her favor as against the guilty party, her husband. 
But the court says it shall be sold and the proceeds 
divided, but that it cannot be sold for less than $53,-
500.00. When is it to be sold? No time limit is set. 
Is the court to call in the parties and say "now is 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is the time to sell"? Suppose the parties cannot agree 
on the price at which the property is to be sold, or 
that they cannot agree as to the terms of the sale. 
How then is the sale to be accomplished? Perhaps the 
court assumes there will be cooperation between 
the parties, but that time has passed. They want, 
and should have, no further dealings with one an-
other. The court has made no disposition of this 
property any more than it made disposition of the 
partnership business. By its decree it has left these 
rna tters "in the air". In other words, it has made no 
equitable distribution or division. 
This home property was not awarded to de-
fendant presumably because a part of the acreage 
has heretofore been used for growing bulbs sold 
from Hyland Floral, but if the property is to be 
sold, it cannot then be beneficial to the Hyland 
Floral business. 
The same is true of the 12.56 acres of hillside 
property valued at $49,500.00. The court decrees 
that it shall continue to be held in joint tenancy 
"subject to mutual control and disposition by the 
parties and subject to the further order of the court, 
and in the interim the parties each to pay one-half 
the cost of maintenance, including taxes." This pro-
perty is to be held in joint tenancy with right of 
survivorship the same as the Wallace Lane property. 
It belongs equally to both parties. That is, each has 
12 
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the same title or interest in the property as the 
other, and the court specificaily perpetuates this 
joint tenancy. Perpetuating titles as they were at the 
time the divorce suit was filed and at the time the 
decree was entered is not an equitable disposition 
or distribution of the property between the parties. 
It is no disposition whatever of the property. 
The Colonial Flower property, by specific pro-
vision of the decree, is also to remain in joint ten-
ancy and the rents equally divided. Again the court 
obliges the parties to contact or deal with each other, 
because if there is an equal division of the rentals, 
the parties cannot avoid contact with one another. 
This arrangement, that is, the continuation of the 
joint tenancy and the division of the rents is to be 
continued until "as soon as may be", the flower 
shop "shall be severed as to title and the home shall 
become and remain the sole property of defendant." 
And then the defendant must accept the home in 
place of her home on Wallace Lane. 
As to the Wallace Lane home, the Hillside pro-
perty and the Colonial Flower property, the court 
decrees that notwithstanding the divorce, the titles 
remain as before the divorce, that is, the parties 
hold as joint tenants until the sale of the Wailace 
Lane home or until the further order of the court. 
"An estate held in joint tenancy is but 
one estate, not a number of estates equal to 
the number of joint tenants, and for some 
13 
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purposes the joint tenants are as one person. 
Each joint tenant is seized of the whole estate; 
he has an undivided share of the whole es-
tate rather than the whole of an undivided 
share. Each tenant is said to hold per my et 
per tout, by the half and by the whole. The 
shares or interests of joint tenants are pre-
sumed to be equal, although the contrary may 
be shown by proof." 48 C.J.S., 930 
"Survivorship is a distinctive character-
istic of an estate in joint tenancy. On the 
death of a joint tenant, the property descends 
to the survivor or survivors, and at length 
to the last survivor." 48 C.J.S. 910-911 
A joint tenant may sell his interest, thus caus-
ing a severance of the joint tenancy and creating a 
tenancy in common between his co-tenant and the 
purchaser. 33 C.J.S., 914. 
What is to prevent either party from selling 
his or her interest in these properties pending the 
"further order of the Court"? Then the other party 
would have adjustments to make with the new co-
tenant. Or suppose one of the parties should die, 
the survivor would have full ownership of all pro-
perty held in joint tenancy in addition to the pro-
perty a warded to him or her by the court, or does 
the court notwithstanding the divorce reserve juris-
diction to compel some sort of settlement by the sur-
vivor with the personal representative of the de-
ceased? There are all these uncertainties as to what 
may occur, all these probabilities of disagreements 
1·1 
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as to the prices at which the joint property shall be 
sold, and the terms of sale; the time when it shall 
be sold; its r.aanagement pending a sale, or pending 
the "further order of the court," all because the trial 
court failed to make a definite, certain and complete 
division of the property as contemplated by the sta-
tute. 
In the case of Shaffer vs. Shaffer, (Wash.) 262 
P. 2d 763, a certain apartment house and its fur-
nishings were awarded to the plaintiff and defen-
dant as "joint owners or tenants in common." The 
property was the principal asset of the parties. The 
court quotes the statute, which provides, among 
other things, that it shall make "such disposition 
of the property of the parties, either community or 
separate, as shall appear just and equitable", and 
then declares : 
"The trial court has a wide discretion in 
this regard, but the result of the decree in the 
case at bar is to leave the Aloha Street pro-
perty the same as if it were community pro-
perty of the parties which had not been before 
the court for disposition. They became tenants 
in common of any community property not 
disposed of by the decree. * * * This was not 
a performance of the court's statutory duty. 
"'The wisdom of the legislative require-
ment is well illustrated by this case. Because 
of the inadequacies in the decree, future litiga-
tion, including a partition action, between the 
parties may be necessary. They should not be 
left with this prospect. They have a right to 
15 
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have their respective interests in their pro-
perty after they are divorced definitely and 
finally determined in the decree which di-
vorces them." 
Our Statute, Section 30-3-5, provides: 
"When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
to * * * property * * * as may be equitable." 
True, the statute also provides: 
"Subsequent changes or new orders may 
be made by the court with respect to * * * 
the distribution of property as may be reas-
onable and proper." · 
But, as before stated, we are not here concerned 
with "subsequent changes" or "new orders". We 
are complaining of the decree as entered. 
This Court in Smith vs. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 
P. 298, declares: 
"The settlement of property rights be-
tween the parties is an incident to every de-
cree of divorce where there is any property 
involved." (Citing cases.) 
"In Roe vs. Roe, 52 Kan. 724, 35 P. 808, 
39 Am. St. Rep. 367, it is said that the final 
judgment in an action granting a divorce 
settles all property rights of the parties, and 
is a bar to action afterwards brought by either 
party to determine the question of alimony, 
or any property rights which might have been 
settled by such judgment." 
The Court will observe that while by para-
graph 9 of the decree it is provided "That so long 
16 
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as plaintiff is obligated to pay alimony hereunder 
defendant is entitled to collect and receive the rents 
from the Colonial Flower property in the total sum 
of $300.00 per month, $150.00 of which shall be 
applied to the payment of said alimony", while in 
paragraph 10 the decree provides "that the rental 
payments under the present lease shall be divided 
equally between the plaintiff and defendant" until 
there is a severance of the home adjoining the Colo-
nial Flower business so as to provide a new home 
for the defendant. These provisions are inconsis-
tent. 
We respectively submit that there has been no 
equitable distribution or division of the properties 
to which we have referred; that as to said properties 
the decree is so incomplete and so indefinite with 
respect to what is to happen in the future, that it 
has no finality. The court has attempted to reserve 
unto himself powers which the statute does not con-
fer upon him and he has in other respects left the 
divorced parties in a situation which m~y very 
easily result in disputes and controversies with re-
spect to the property they are compelled to hold in 
common both as to the management of it and as to 
the sale of it, that the decree does not do equity 
between the parties; that it does not conclude all 
matters which at a dissolution of their marriage 
should have been finally and completely settled be-
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tween them. The court's wide discretionary power 
does not authorize it to render a decree that is in-
complete and uncertain as to property that is to 
be disposed of under powers which the court under-
takes to reserve unto itself. The ultimate result will 
be to continue this litigation between these parties 
interminably with a constant reopening of old 
wounds, the reliving of old grievances and the re-
sulting emotional disturbance will foredoom any 
attempt on the part of either to get their lives back 
on a normal plane. 
POINT II. 
'THE DECREE DOES NOT MAKE AN EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES. 
On the date of the trial plaintiff was 55 years 
of age; defendant was 52 years. The trial court's 
Memorandum Decision lists the real property ac-
cumulated during coverture, the title to all of which 
is in their joint names with the exception of one 
tract of 2.56 acres which is in the name of the plain-
tiff only. However, this tract was purchased from 
funds obtained from the Hyland Floral business 
and both parties have a joint interest in it. ( R. 80) 
In fact, plaintiff was not aware that title was in 
his name only until the trial ( R. 80) . 
The decree provides the Hyland Floral partner-
ship is continued until further order of the court, 
the plaintiff to receive the sun1 of $500.00 a month 
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as a management fee, which he is paid before net 
partnership earnings are continued. (R. 206) Why 
should the defendant be required to contribute 
$250.00 per n1onth towards the salary of the plain-
tiff in whom she lacks confidence and with whom 
she no longer wishes to be associated in business. 
Is this payment to continue until the full duration 
of the lease, until June 1, 1959 and then for the ad-
ditional period of four years if the option to renew 
the lease is exercised? 
The cash surrender on the life insurance policies 
awarded to the defendant amounts to $627.00. She 
was awarded the New York Life policy, number 
21351613, which has a cash surrender value of 
$2,109.33 (R. 10), however, this latter policy was 
her separate property in which plaintiff had no 
interest. Plaintiff was awarded the balance of the 
insurance policies, including a Commercial Travelers 
Insurance Company policy, number 22766 (R. 211) 
(This policy is not included in the list on Rec. 10 as 
counsel were not aware of its existence until after 
said list had been compiled.) Total cash surrender 
value of the policies awarded to the plaintiff is 
$4,141.15, as compared to $627.00, the cash surren-
der value of the policies awarded to defendant. 
Plaintiff was also awarded the uranium stock 
and oil lease ( R. 207). The evidence showed that 
while most of the uranium stock had no market 
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value at the time of trial, the 10,000 shares of Blue 
Lizzard stock had a value of 11c a share, or $1,100.00 
( R. 23, 24) . The oil lease was subleased to the 
California Oil and Development Company, for which 
the plaintiff receives a rental. The purchase price 
of this lease was $1,000.00 (R. 87) 
It seems that an equitable division of the fore-
going property would require that the defendant 
receive at least half of the value thereof. 
The decree provides that the home on Wallace 
Lane, where the parties have lived the last thirteen 
years of their married life, is to be sold and the pro-
ceeds divided, presumably because it is a ten room 
home. Defendant testified that she lived only in part 
of it, the upper rooms being used when she was 
visited by grandchildren or friends ( R. 17 0) . Is 
it unreasonable for defendant to want to continue 
to live in this home which has great sentimental 
value to her? (R. 137) Which is also located in a 
neighborhood where her friends and relatives live. 
The decree awards the residence adjacent to the 
Colonial Floral to the defendant as a home (R. 209, 
p. 5 Memorandum Decision), now under lease and 
which is an integral part of the Colonial Floral busi-
ness. The heat from this residence is supplied by a 
plant located on the floral premises ( R. 179). The 
residence and the floral business are and have been 
operated as one unit, and in the interests of busi-
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ness efficiency should probably be so operated in 
the future. Again we say, why should the defendant 
be required to move into a home or neighborhood 
which she considers less desirable than where she 
now is and has spent some of the happiest years of 
her life? It is true that until the year 1956 the plain-
tiff used three acres of the Wallace Lane home pro-
perty in which to plant flowers and bulbs, which 
\Vas pa:rt of the operation of the Hyland Floral. If 
this property is awarded to the defendant, is there 
any reason why the use of these three acres for this 
purpose cannot be continued? Defendant testified 
that she has no objection so long as the plaintiff 
assumed any expense connected with said use (R. 
136). 
We anticipate that plaintiff will contend that it 
is not economically feasible to liquidate the Hyland 
Floral business before the expiration of the lease 
term. If this is so, in equity, why should not this 
property be awarded to the plaintiff as his sole 
1 ~ and separate property and the defendant be awarded 
the equivalent of her interest in the Hyland Floral 
from the defendant's share of real estate now held 
in the joint names of the parties. 
This Court has often affirmed the principle 
that no firm rule can be uniformly applied in all 
divorce cases; that the distribution of property and 
awarding of alimony must be determined by the 
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circumstances of each case. Defendant contends that 
she should be a warded the home property on Wallace 
Lane. If necessary for the operation of Hyland 
Floral, plaintiff to have the right to farm three 
acres of that property for the duration of the Hyland 
Floral lease; that she should be awarded one-half 
of the value of the remaining property, all of which 
has been accumulated by the joint efforts of the 
parties during their married life ( R. 108). That in 
addition the plaintiff should be required to pay her 
alimony in the sum of $350.00 per month in order 
that she may continue to live according to the sta-
tion which she had enjoyed before this divorce. She 
is 52 years of age and her opportunities for remar-
riage, even if desired, are limited. Her health is not 
good (R. 106, 108, 114) and with advancing age 
will probably not improve. The floral business is 
all she knows ( R. 106) , which is hard work and 
beyond her physical ability except perhaps in a 
supervisory capacity. 
There is no evidence to support plaintiff's al-
legations of cruelty on the part of the defendant. 
Her conversation with Mickelson, the family friend 
and financial advisor, was at the suggestion of the 
boys, both of whom at that time were working in 
the Hyland Floral business (R. 105). Her conver-
sation with the Bishop of her church was motivated 
by a desire to effect a reconciliation with the plain-
tiff. 
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It is recognized that there is no authority in 
the laws of this state for administering punitive 
measures in a divorce judgment, however, the court 
may consider the relative loyalty or disloyalty of the 
parties to the marriage vows and their relative 
guilt or innocence in causing the breakup of the 
marriage. This Court in Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 
Utah 157, 292 P. 2d 214, said 
"We think the rule contended for by the 
plaintiff is the correct rule, and is in line with 
the later cases from this jurisdiction. Of 
course, the rights and equities of both parties 
are to be considered, but, whatever doubt 
there may be concerning the rna tter, it ought 
to be resolved against the guilty party whose 
fault and wrongs and breaches of the marital 
relation destroyed the home and forced or 
brought about the separation. 
"In Decker v. Decker, supra, the court said: 
" 'It is also a rule of equity in such cases 
that the wife shall not be put in a worse con-
dition by reason of her marriage, the dissolu-
tion of which has been caused by her hus-
band's willful misconduct. 'Equity and good 
conscience require that the husband shall not 
profit by his own wrong, and that restitution 
shall be made to the wife of the property 
which she brought to the husband, or a suit-
able sum in lieu thereof be allowed out of his 
estate, so far as may be done consistently with 
the preservation of the rights of each, and also 
that a fair division shall be made, taking into 
consideration the relative wants, circum-
stances and necessities of each, of the property 
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accumulated by their joint efforts and sav-
ings.' 
"The court there further stated: 
"'After the equities of the parties in the 
property are adjusted, then the husband 
should be caused to pay or not to pay a fur-
ther sum for support and maintenance in 
money payments at stated intervals, accord-
ing to whether or not the wife is equitably 
entitled to further payment after a consider-
ation of all the facts that enter into a proper 
solution of that question.' 
"In Van Gordor v. Van Gordor, supra, the court 
said: 
"'Upon the law of the case, natural jus-
tice requires that at least one-half of the 
property, representing the joint accumula-
tions of husband and wife for a lifetime, 
should go to the wife, where she obtains a 
decree of divorce through the fault of the 
husband. Where, as in this case, the husband 
and wife have lived together until she is un-
able to perform hard labor, and have, by their 
joint labor, management and economy, ac-
quired property sufficient to support them 
both comfortably when living together, cer-
tainly when the wife is forced by the miscon-
duct of the husband to seek separation, she 
ought to receive sufficient property to support 
her comfortably, living alone, without refer-
ence to her ability to work and contribute to 
her own support.'" 
See also MacDonald vs. MacDonald, 120 Utah 
573~ 236 P. 2d 1066, and lVilson vs. Wilson, 5 Utah 
2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977. 
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Paragraph 11 of the Decree also provides that 
neither party shall recover costs or attorneys' fees 
from the other. Again it is recognized that the 
awarding of these items is discretionary with the 
court and depend upon the particular circumstances, 
however, inasmuch as the defendant did not want 
this divorce and in fact did everything she possibly 
could to save the marriage, in equity she should be 
awarded her attorneys' fees and costs. 
CONCLUSirON 
We respectfully submit that the Decree of the 
trial court should be set aside and: ( 1) that there 
be an accounting of the partnership property be-
tween the parties and a complete adjudication of 
their rights in that real estate now held in joint 
tenancy; ( 2) that defendant be awarded the home 
property at 4580 Wallace Lane, together with one-
ha1f of the property accumulated by the parties 
during their marriage, and (3) that she be award-
ed reasonable alimony and attorneys' fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
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